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This paper documents that over the past 25 years, aggregate hourly real wages in the 
United States have become substantially more volatile relative to output. We use micro-
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to show that this increase in relative 
volatility is predominantly due to increases in the relative volatility of hourly wages 
across different groups of workers. Compositional changes, by contrast, account for at 
most 12% of the increase in relative wage volatility. Using a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, we show that the observed increase in relative wage 
volatility is unlikely to come from changes outside of the labor market (e.g. smaller 
exogenous shocks or more aggressive monetary policy). By contrast, increased 
flexibility in wage setting is capable of accounting for a large fraction of the observed 
increase in relative wage volatility. At the same time, increased wage flexibility 
generates a substantial decrease in the magnitude of business cycle fluctuations, which 
suggests a promising new explanation for the Great Moderation. 
 
Keywords: Wage volatility, business cycles, great moderation, current population 
survey, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models 
 
JEL Classification: E24, E32 
 
1 Introduction
The 25 years prior to the current recession were a time of unprecedented macroeconomic stability
for the United States. During that period, referred to by many as the Great Moderation, the
business cycle volatility of U.S. output declined by more than 50% and the volatility of many other
macroeconomic aggregates fell by similar proportions.1
In this paper, we show that the Great Moderation does not apply to one of the most prominent
labor market aggregates: the average real hourly wage (or aggregate wagesfor short). Specically,
we document the following results:
1. From 1948-1984 to 1984-2006, the business cycle volatility of the aggregate wage increased
between 30 and 70 percent, depending on the ltering method and nominal deator used.
2. As a result, the business cycle volatility of the aggregate wage relative to the volatility of
aggregate output experienced a three- to four-fold increase over the two sample periods.
The increase in both absolute and relative volatility of aggregate wages raises several questions.
First, to what extent does this increase apply to di¤erent groups of workers? Second and related,
how much of the increase in volatility is due to compositional changes of the workforce; i.e. a shift
of the workforce towards jobs with more volatile wages? Third, to what extent is the increase in
volatility related to structural changes in the U.S. labor market? Fourth, how do such labor market
changes contribute to our understanding of business cycle uctuations in general and the Great
Moderation in particular?
To answer the rst and second question, we use microdata from the Current Population Survey
(CPS) to construct hourly wage series for di¤erent groups of workers. We document that the increase
in absolute volatility of the real wage is not generalized but concentrated among male, skilled and
young workers. Also, there are large di¤erences across industries, with absolute volatilities of hourly
wages in many industries decreasing. However, these decreases are generally modest and thus, the
volatility of real hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggregate output increases substantially
across most of decompositions considered. We call this phenomenon the Great Increase in Relative
Volatility of Real Wages.
To quantify how much of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is due to
increases in relative volatility of wages across di¤erent groups of workers, we develop an accounting
method that allows us to decompose the increase in aggregate wage volatility into compositional
changes and changes in relative volatilities and correlations. The main result coming out of this
1See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001) or Stock and Watson (2002).
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exercise is that the large increase in relative volatility of aggregate wages is predominantly due to
the increase in the relative volatility of wages of the di¤erent worker groups. Compositional changes
of the labor force, by contrast, account for at most 12% of the increase in the relative volatility of
the aggregate wage. This suggests that the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is
due to changes in the economic environment that a¤ected wage dynamics of most groups of workers,
although to varying degrees.
To address the third and fourth question, we build a small Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium (DSGE) model with a stylized wage setting function that allows for varying degrees of wage
rigidity. We calibrate the model consistent with U.S. data and show that while changes in the
importance of exogenous shock processes can have a sizable e¤ect on the absolute volatility and
cyclicality of aggregate wages, their e¤ect on the relative volatility of wages is negligible. Similarly,
structural changes to the economy that do not directly a¤ect the labor market (e.g. a more ag-
gressive monetary policy response to ination) are unlikely to have a large e¤ect on the relative
volatility of wages. By contrast, more exible wage setting is capable of accounting for a large
fraction of the observed increase in relative wage volatility and simultaneously implies a substantial
decrease in the magnitude of business cycle uctuations for given exogenous shocks.2 We conrm
the robustness of our ndings in the larger DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) that contains
many frictions and shocks. These results suggest that the hypothesis of increased wage exibility
has a lot of potential to rationalize the observed changes in U.S. labor market dynamics and at the
same time provides a promising new explanation for the Great Moderation.
The hypothesis of increased exibility in wage setting is appealing for several reasons. On the
one hand, it is consistent with the documented rise in individual earnings volatility in the U.S. in
the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt, 1994; Dynan et al., 2008). On the other hand,
the U.S. labor market has undergone several important changes over the past 25 years that are
likely to have led to increased exibility in wage setting. Among them are the large decrease in
private sector unionization (e.g. Farber and Western, 2001); the shift towards performance-pay
contracts (e.g. Lemieux et al., 2008); the erosion of the minimum wage (e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996);
and the increase in temporary help services (e.g. Estevao and Lach, 1999) and overtime work
hours (e.g. Kuhn and Lozano, 2008). In the last part of the paper, we discuss in more detail the
cases of deunionization and performance-pay. On theoretical grounds, both deunionization and the
shift towards performance-pay contracts should make wages more sensitive to current business cycle
conditions, thus increasing their volatility. On empirical grounds, this is conrmed by Lemieux et al.
2Increased wage exibility does not render the economy immune to large business cycle shocks such as the ones
experienced during the recent nancial crisis. Our results suggest that the e¤ects of these large shocks would have
been more severe if wage setting had been as rigid as in the early 1980s.
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(2008) who document that wages are more responsive to changes in local labor market conditions for
non-union and performance-pay contracts. Furthermore, we show that the decrease in unionization
and the shift towards performance-pay contracts roughly coincide with the evolution of relative
wage volatility over time.
Our paper contributes to a recent literature on changes in labor market dynamics over the past
decades. Most notably, Barnichon (2008), Gali and Gambetti (2009) and Stiroh (2009) document
that the Great Moderation period is characterized by an increase in the relative volatility of hours
worked and a fall in the correlation of labor productivity with output and hours.3 Gali and Van
Rens (2009) build a DSGE model with labor hoarding and search frictions and nd that a decrease
in search frictions can account for both of these changes in labor market dynamics. Gali and Van
Rens (2009) also note the increase in volatlity of aggregate wages and argue that under certain
assumptions about wage setting, a decrease in labor frictions may endogenously increase wage
exibility.4 Compared to Gali and Van Rens (2009), our paper focuses more squarely on wage
volatility. In particular, we are the rst to document that the increase in the relative volatility of
wages is generalized across di¤erent worker groups and not due to compositional changes of the
labor force. As we argue in the paper, this result is important because it suggests that the increase
in wage volatility is related to structural changes in the labor market that a¤ect wage dynamics of
all groups of workers. At the same time, we uncover that increased wage exibility is also a powerful
mechanism to account for the Great Moderation.5
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we document the increase in wage
volatility of di¤erent aggregate hourly wage measures. Section 3 presents changes in relative wage
volatility across di¤erent worker decompositions and implements the volatility accounting exercise.
Section 4 describes our DSGE model and simulates the e¤ects of increased wage exibility. Section
5 explores the decline in unionization and the shift towards performance-pay as potential sources
of increased wage exibility. Furthermore, we discuss the hypothesis put forward by Gali and Van
Rens (2009) that labor search frictions have declined. Section 6 concludes.
3By contrast, Manovskii and Hagedorn (2009) nd that labor productivity constructed from CPS data instead of
aggregate data from the BLS is more procyclical and remains so even after 1984.
4Champagne (2007) and Gourio (2007) are two other, unpublished manuscripts that document the increase in
wage volatility during the Great Moderation. The ndings in Champagne (2007) provided the starting point for the
present paper.
5Davis and Kahn (2008) suggest that greater wage exibility may o¤er a unied explanation for the observed rise
in income volatility and the Great Moderation. However, they do not formally investigate this conjecture.
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2 Aggregate hourly wages during the Great Moderation
In this section, we document the increase in volatility of aggregate real hourly wages in the United
States. We rst describe the construction of our preferred measure of aggregate hourly wages and
present the main results. Then, we discuss alternative aggregate wage series and show further
results. For the sake of brevity, we keep the description of the data to a minimum. An appendix
that is available on the authorswebsites provides more detailed information and contains several
robustness checks.
2.1 Data
The most comprehensive aggregate wage series in the United States comes from the Labor Pro-
ductivity and Costs (LPC) program. This program is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) and covers total compensation and
hours worked for about 98% of non-farm occupations. Total compensation includes direct wage
and salary payments (including executive compensation); commissions, tips and bonuses; as well as
supplements such as vacation pay or employer contributions to pension and health plans. Aggregate
hourly wages are computed by dividing total compensation by total hours worked. To obtain real
aggregate hourly wages, we deate this measure by the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE)
deator from the NIPA tables. All of our results are robust to alternative deators such as the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) or output deators. To compare our wage series with the business
cycle, we use non-farm real chain-weighted GDP per capita, obtained from the National Income
and Products Accounts (NIPA).
All data series are logged and ltered to extract the business cycle component. We use three
di¤erent ltering methods: (i) a quarterly rst-di¤erence lter; (ii) a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter;
and (iii) a Bandpass Filter (BP) proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).6
2.2 Main results
Table 1 shows the standard deviation of output and aggregate real hourly wages for the period
1948:1-1983:4 and for the period 1984:1-2006:4, with standard errors for each estimate provided in
6The rst-di¤erence lter removes stochastic trends but also cuts out a substantial part of business cycle uctua-
tions. The HP lter is close to a high-pass lter that removes trends but leaves all other uctuations, including high
frequency uctuations. The BP lter removes both low and high frequency uctuations and only keeps uctuations
with periodicities between 6 and 32 quarters.
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parenthesis.7 The sample split is motivated by the Great Moderation literature that estimates a
break in output volatility in 1984 (e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000). While output volatility
decreased by about 60% over the two periods (i.e. the Great Moderation), the volatility of aggregate
hourly wages increased substantially. The p-value of Levenes (1960) test of equal variance indicates
that these changes in volatility are highly signicant.8 The di¤erent evolution of output and wage
volatility is even more striking when considering relative standard deviations. As the last column of
Table 1 shows, the volatility of wages relative to the volatility of output has increased by a factor of
3 to 3.5 over the two samples. These ratios are far above the changes in relative volatility observed
for other macro aggregates during the Great Moderation (see discussion in Section 4).
To further illustrate the change in relative volatility of aggregate wages, we plot the volatility of
output and aggregate wages over 8-year rolling windows. As the rst panel of Figure 1 illustrates,
the volatility of output fell precipitously in the 1980s whereas the volatility of the aggregate wage
steadily increased steadily during the 1980s and 1990s. The standard error bands indicate that
both of these changes are signicant. As shown in the second panel, the relative volatility of the
aggregate wage thus increased dramatically and signicantly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.
Thereafter, the relative volatility of aggregate wages returns to an intermediate level that remains,
however, more than twice as high than the level before the mid-1980s.
We take away two main results from Table 1 and Figure 1. First, as the volatility of output
drops during the Great Moderation, the absolute volatility of aggregate wages increases. Second,
the drop in output volatility is proportionally much larger than the increase in aggregate wage
volatility. The three- to four-fold increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is thus driven
to a large part by the drop in output volatility. The challenge for any theory is to explain how there
can be such a marked fall in output volatility without a similar fall in the volatility of aggregate
wages.
2.3 Evidence from other aggregate wage measures
The aggregate wage series from the LPC program is a very broad measure of compensation that
includes not only wages and salaries but also stock options. Mehran and Tracy (2001) argue that
this may provide a misleading picture of the evolution and volatility of compensation in the 1990s
since these stock options are recorded when realized, not when handed out to employees. We
7When computing the volatility of aggregate wages or other macro variables, we drop the rst and last year to
improve the accuracy of the lters. Standard errors are computed via the delta method from GMM-based estimates.
See the appendix for details.
8The largest p-value of 0.13 occurs for the rst-di¤erenced wage series. Since rst-di¤erencing lters out a
substantial part of business cycle uctuations, we attribute less importance to this exception.
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thus check the robustness of our results with three other measures of aggregate hourly measures
constructed, respectively, from the CPS May/MORG, the NBER manufacturing database and the
Private Economy Labor Quality (PELQ) database.
As described in more detail in the next section, the hourly wage measure from the CPS
May/MORG is computed from a representative sample of employed individuals and takes into
account wages and salaries, overtime earnings, tips, commissions and bonuses if paid as part of
usual compensation. Stock options are not included. The wage measure from the NBER database
covers wages of production workers in about 450 four-digit manufacturing industries and is unlikely
to be inuenced by stock options either. The wage measure from the PELQ database is constructed
by Dale Jorgenson and co-authors from a cross-section of CPS and Census data and also excludes
stock options (e.g. Jorgenson et al., 2008). The frequency of each of these datasets is annual and
spans the period 1973-2006 for the CPS, 1976-2002 for the NBER manufacturing database, and
1976-2000 for the PELQ database.
Table 2 presents the results for the di¤erent aggregate wage series together with an annualized
version of the LPC measure, both in rst-di¤erenced and HP ltered form.9 The PELQ measure
shows the largest increases in wage volatility, matching the results of the LPC measure almost
exactly. The NBERmanufacturing measure and the CPS measure show a somewhat smaller increase
in absolute wage volatility, but their relative wage volatility still increases by a factor of 2.5 or more.
We can only speculate about the reason for these di¤erences. For the NBER measure, they may
be due to the exclusive focus on production workers in manufacturing; for the CPS measure, they
may be due to top-coding of large income workers who have seen a more important increase in wage
volatility in the post-1984 period than the average worker (see next section). The key point remains,
however, that as the volatility of output drops during the Great Moderation, the volatility of all of
these wage measures remains stable or even increases slightly. As a result, the relative volatility of
aggregate wages increases by a factor of 2.6 to 3.8 between the pre-1984 and the post-1984 period.
Another aggregate wage measure to consider is the Average Hourly Earnings (AHE) series from
the Current Establishment Survey (CES) of the BLS. As Champagne (2007) and Gali and Van Rens
(2009) document, the absolute volatility of the AHE aggregate wage measure declines substantially
from the pre-1984 to the post-1984 period and as a result, its relative volatility remains roughly
constant. Given the popularity of the AHE measure in both academic research and the business
press, it is important to investigate this di¤erence further. We follow Abraham et al. (1998) who
document in earlier work that the AHE wage measure diverges greatly from other aggregate wage
9As recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the HP lter parameter to 6:25. We do not report BP ltered
results for annual data because the BP lter requires us to cut uctuations of 2 years or less. This would remove a
potentially important part of business cycle uctuations.
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measures in terms of its trend over time. For example, whereas the aggregate wage series from the
NIPA (basically our QCEW series from the LPC) increases by about 7% over the 1973-1993 period,
the AHE measure falls by about 10% over the same period. Abraham et al. (1998) consider three
possible explanations for this divergence in trends: (i) problems related the underrepresentation of
young establishments in the CES; (ii) di¤erences in the earnings concept used; and (iii) di¤erences
in the worker population covered. We examine to what extent any of these three possibilities can
explain the very di¤erent evolution of the volatility of the AHE measure.10
We start with di¤erences in the worker population covered. The AHE measure covers only
production and non-supervisory workers, which account for about 80% of total payroll, whereas
the aggregate wage measures from the LPC, the CPS May/MORG and the PELQ database are
representative of the entire workforce.11 It is possible that the wage volatility of the 20% of workers
not covered by the AHE increases by so much in the post-1984 period that it more than outweighs the
drop in wage volatility in the AHE measure. To assess this possibility, we use the CPS May/MORG
data together with occupational denitions from the BLS to recreate an hourly wage series for
production and non-supervisory workers, as presumably captured by the AHE measure, and an
hourly wage series for the remaining private-sector workers. We nd that the wage volatility of both
of these series remains approximatively constant over the pre-1984 and the post-1984 sample period.
As a result, the wage volatility of both worker groups relative to the volatility of output increases
by a factor of more than 2.5. Abraham et al. (1998) further argue in their paper that employers
in the CES often interpret production and non-supervisory workers as employees paid by the hour
and other employees that are non-exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Since wages of
hourly workers and other non-exempt workers have fallen over their 1973-1993 period, Abraham et
al. (1998) conclude that this di¤erence in worker coverage provides the best possible explanation
for the divergence in wage trends between the AHE measure and other wage measures. As we
show in the next section, however, the relative volatility of hourly workerswages also increases
substantially in the post-1984 period. It is therefore unlikely that di¤erences in worker population
covered can explain the diverging evolution of wage volatility of the AHE measure compared to the
di¤erent other aggregate wage measures.
10Another obvious candidate for di¤erences in wage volatility across di¤erent wage series is measurement error.
For measurement error to explain the very di¤erent evolution of wage volatility between the AHE series and the
other aggregate wage series, however, it would have to be the case that the measurement error for the AHE series
relative to the LPC, CPS May/MORG and PELQ measure decreased substantially. We know of no evidence that
points in this direction.
11According to Abraham et al. (1998), the proportion of production and non-supervisory workers in total employ-
ment has remained roughly constant over the 1973-1993 period.
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Second, we consider di¤erences in earnings concepts. The AHE does not include tips and records
commissions and bonuses only if earned and paid in the same period. The CPS May/MORG wage
series is the closest to the AHE measure in this respect because it records commissions and bonuses
only if they are part of usual earnings. This leaves tips as a di¤erence. As Abraham et al. (1998)
report, the BEA estimates tips to be a mere 0.3% of total weekly compensation in 1993. Hence, even
if the volatility of tips had increased greatly, this would not explain why the volatility of the CPS
May/MORG wage measure increased by such a large amount relative to the AHE wage measure.
Third, we turn to the issue of underrepresentation of young establishments in the CES. As Abra-
ham et al. (1998) explain, the CES sample of reporting establishments was not rotated regularly
for most of the sample period we consider. Hence, young establishments are typically underrepre-
sented. Furthermore, the CES sample grew from about 166,000 establishments in 1980 to about
333,000 establishments in 1993, which is likely to have led to an increase of the proportion of young
establishments in the CES sample. While Abraham et al. (1998) conclude that the e¤ect of this
expansion on aggregate wage trends is likely to be modest, it is possible that this expansion explains
at least part of the di¤erence in the evolution of wage volatility. Absent micro data on the di¤erent
CES establishments, however, we cannot investigate this possibility further. The di¤erence in the
evolution of wage volatility for the AHE measure relative to the other aggregate wage measures
thus remains a puzzle. Given the similarity of results across the LPC, the CPS May/MORG, the
NBER manufacturing database and the PELQ database, it appears safe to conclude, however, that
the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages is a robust feature of the data and not an
artifact of some particular measurement of compensation or restriction to a narrow segment of the
worker population.
3 A closer look at disaggregated data
To further investigate the increase in volatility of real hourly wages, we take the CPS data and
construct wage series for di¤erent groups of workers. We rst describe important details about the
CPS data and then look at the evolution of wage volatility for di¤erent groups of workers. Based
on these decompositions, we develop an accounting method that allows us to quantify how much of
the increase in the volatility of the aggregate wage is due to increases in wage volatility of di¤erent
worker groups.
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3.1 CPS data
The CPS is the o¢ cial household-based labor market survey in the U.S. It collects information on
roughly 60,000 households about various worker characteristics. Following Lemieux (2006), we use
the Dual Jobs Supplement of the CPS May extracts for the 1973-1978 period and the CPS Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) for the 1979-2006 period to construct annual series of average
hourly wages and hours of work.12 From the total sample, we drop all unemployed, self-employed,
and individuals under 16 years old. We also remove private household workers, agricultural workers,
armed force personnel, and individuals with no data on either earnings or hours. For the remaining
sample, we collect a direct measure of the hourly wage rate for all workers paid by the hour (i.e.
hourly workers). For workers not paid by the hour (i.e. non-hourly workers), we compute an
hourly wage rate by dividing usual weekly earnings by usual weekly hours. We then combine these
hourly wage data with the appropriate CPS weights to compute a representative time series for the
aggregate non-farm hourly wage rate as well as average hourly wage rates for di¤erent groups of
workers as dened below.13
There are two important issues with the CPS data that we need to address for our time-series
analysis of wages: topcoding and the 1994 redesign of the CPS. Topcoding in general may lead to
biased measures of wage volatility because variations in wages of topcoded individuals cannot be
taken into account. Furthermore, there have been several adjustments of the topcoding threshold
over time, which may lead to discontinuities in our wage series and overstate the volatility of wage
series.14 To account for topcoding, several researchers have taken a simple adjustment rule and
multiplied topcoded earnings observations by a factor of 1.3 or 1.4. Others have tried to estimate
the mean above the topcode based on di¤erent distributional assumptions. The most popular among
them is the Pareto distribution approach, which has been shown to provide the best approximation
12The MORG data is available on a quarterly basis. Since the data only starts in 1979, we do not consider the
MORG data in isolation but compute annual averages from the quarterly data and combine them with the May
extracts for a longer sample.
13Alternatively, we could have computed hourly wage series from the CPS March Supplements. The CPS March
data would have the advantage that it starts in 1963 rather than 1973. However, before 1976, only weekly earnings
can be computed, which is a biased measure of hourly wages if hours worked vary across weeks. Furthermore, as
Lemieux (2006) argues, CPS March wage measures are subject to substantial measurement error that are not present
in the CPS May/MORG data. The reason for this di¤erence is that the CPS March collects labor earnings only on
a yearly basis. The CPS May/MORG, by contrast, asks directly for the wage rate for hourly workers. This seems to
yield more precise answers. For these reasons, we refrain from using CPS March data.
14For hourly worker, wages are topcoded at $99.99 per hour, a threshold that is rarely crossed. For non-hourly
workers, weekly earnings are topcoded at $999 before 1989, $1,923 before 1998 and $2,884 thereafter. A substantial
share of individuals is above that threshhold at any time of the sample.
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of the actual mean in condential CPS samples.15 We use a battery of di¤erent topcode adjustment
methods and nd that our volatility results do not di¤er across methods. For simplicity, we thus
report all of our results here for topcoded weakly earnings adjusted by a factor of 1.3.
The second important issue is the CPS redesign in 1994, more specically the treatment of
weekly overtime earnings, tips, and commissions (OTC). Before 1994, hourly workers were asked
to report their hourly wage rate, without a specied question on OTC earnings. After 1994, a
specic question was added to hourly workers about weekly OTC earnings.16 The consequence of
this redesign is a potential discontinuity in the wage series for hourly workers, which could lead
to an overstatement of the wage volatility in the post-1984 period. To check whether this may be
the case, we compute two alternative wage series for hourly workers. First, we simply drop OTC
earnings after 1994. Second, we adjust the wage series for non-hourly workers before 1994 with a
linear trend so as to correct for any discontinuity. In both cases, all of our results remain robust,
meaning that the addition of the OTC question in 1994 for non-hourly workers does not lead to an
overstatement of the volatility in CPS wages.
3.2 Wage volatility across di¤erent decompositions
We consider four di¤erent decompositions: (i) skill / gender; (ii) skill / age; (iii) skill / employment
status; and (iv) skill / industry a¢ liation.17 Following Krusell et al. (2000) and many others,
we measure skill by years of schooling. To keep the decomposition manageable, we consider only
two groups, dening a skilled workeras someone with a college degree (bachelor) or more, and
an unskilled worker as someone with less than a college degree. The denitions of the other
decompositions are described below.
For each of the decompositions, we compute an average hourly wage series and follow the same
procedure as for the aggregate wage series: lter the series to extract the business cycle component;
split the sample into a pre-1984 and a post-1984 period; compute the volatility of the hourly wage
series both in absolute terms and relative to the volatility of aggregate output.18 Aside from the
15See Feenberg and Poterba (1992), Polivka (2000) and Schmitt (2003).
16For non-hourly workers, the usual weekly earnings include OTC earnings throughout the whole sample. As a
result, the CPS redesign did not a¤ect the usual weekly earnings of non-hourly workers.
17Given the discussion about the e¤ects of deunionization on wage exibility in Section 5, it would be interesting
to do a decomposition along union membership as well. Unfortunately, the CPS MORG does not provide union data
before 1983, and for 1981 and 1982 the CPS May contains only very few (respectively no) individuals with information
on union membership. This makes it impossible to compute reliable wage series for unionized and non-unionized
workers for the pre-1984 sample.
18All results are reported for H-P ltered data with constant 6:25 as before. We cut o¤ the rst and last year of
the sample to improve the accuracy of the lter. All the conclusions are robust to alternative lters.
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volatility of the hourly wage, we also report the average wage share and the volatility of the hours
share, dened, respectively, as the fraction of total earnings and total hours accounted for by a
given worker group (the formal denition is provided in Section 3.3). Both of these statistics turn
out to be important for the volatility accounting exercise below.
Gender / skill decomposition
Table 3 reports the decomposition for gender and skill. The rst noticeable change across
subsamples is the increase in the relative importance of skilled and female workers (as measured
by average wage shares). Second, we observe that the absolute volatility of hourly wages increases
for all but skilled female workers for which wage volatility falls slightly. Relative to the volatility of
output, however, the volatility of wages increases substantially across all groups. This is especially
pronounced for male skilled workers who see their relative wage volatility increase by a factor of
4.5. By contrast to the hourly wage, the volatility of hoursshare decreases markedly for all groups.
As a result, the relative volatility of hoursshare increases by much less and actually falls for both
male and female skilled workers.
Age / skill decomposition
Table 4 displays the decomposition for age and skill. Following Gomme et al. (2004), and
Jaimovich and Siu (2008), we create three age groups: 16-29 year olds (young workers); 30-59 year
olds (grown-ups); and 60-70 year olds (old workers). As the changes in the average wage shares
show, there is a substantial shift in the workforce from young to grown-up workers between the
pre-1984 and the post-1984 period. In terms of volatility, we nd that the absolute volatility for
all but the young skilled workers decreases. However, this increase is modest for all but the old
skilled workers. As a result, the relative volatility of wages still increases strongly for all but this
last group. In particular, the relative wage volatility of young skilled workers increases by a factor
of 4.5. For hoursshare, in turn, the picture is very similar to the gender-skill decomposition: in
absolute terms, the hoursshare volatility falls substantially for almost all worker groups and thus,
the relative volatility remains on average more or less unchanged.19
Employment situation / skill decomposition
Table 5 shows the decomposition for employment status and skill, where employment status
is measured by whether a worker is paid an hourly wage rate or a non-hourly salary in his main
job. As for the gender / skill decomposition, the evolution of the average wage share indicates that
there is a shift towards a more skilled workforce. The volatility of wages increases for all but the
19As a sidenote, Gomme et al. (2004) and Jaimovich and Siu (2008) document that the volatility of hours displays
a U-shaped pattern with respect to age. As Table 4 shows, the same U-shaped pattern is present for the volatility
of hoursshare.
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non-hourly unskilled group. The relative volatility of wages thus increases markedly for all worker
groups. Interestingly, this increase is most pronounced for hourly unskilled workers and non-hourly
skilled workers, the two opposites in this decomposition. In terms of hoursshare, the situation is
similar to the above decompositions: the volatility of hoursshare decreases substantially and thus,
its change in relative volatility is much more muted than for the hourly wage.
Industry / skill decomposition
Table 6 reports the decomposition for industry a¢ liation and skill. We choose a relatively
detailed decomposition into 10 private sector industries and one public administration sector. The
importance of the wage share for the service sector increases markedly whereas the wage share of
unskilled manufacturing groups decreases. In terms of volatility, we see that the wage volatility of
many groups decreases. As for the age / skill decomposition, however, this decrease in volatility
is generally modest and thus, the increase in relative volatility of wages remains large for all but
communications and public sector workers (both skilled and unskilled). For hoursshare, the picture
is reversed. Most worker groups see a large decrease in absolute volatility and thus, the relative
volatility of hoursshare increases only modestly on average.
We take away three stylized facts from the di¤erent decompositions. First, there are important
shifts in the workforce as measured by average wage shares. Second, there are substantial di¤erences
in the evolution of wage volatility across di¤erent worker groups. The largest increases in volatility
occur for male, skilled and young workers. Many other groups, especially in the industry / skill
decomposition, see their wage volatility decrease. However, these decreases are relatively modest
in absolute terms and thus, the volatility of real hourly wages relative to the volatility of aggregate
output increases substantially for almost every worker group. This phenomenon is what we call in
the introduction The Great Increase in Relative Volatility of Real Wages. Third and nally, there
is a more substantial decrease in the volatility of hoursshare for most worker groups. As a result,
changes in the relative volatility of hoursshare are on average much more modest. These stylized
facts are robust with respect to other decompositions that we attempted with the CPS data (details
are available from the authors upon request).
3.3 Volatility accounting
An obvious question coming out of the di¤erent decompositions is how much of the increase in
absolute and relative volatility of aggregate wages is due to changes in wage volatilities within the
di¤erent worker groups and how much is due to compositional changes of the workforce (i.e. a
shift of the workforce towards jobs with more volatile wages). To quantify these e¤ects, we develop
an accounting method that allows us to decompose the increase in aggregate wage volatility into
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compositional changes, changes in volatilities of hourly wages and hoursshares, and changes in
correlations thereof.
By denition, the aggregate real hourly wage wt equals the sum of average real hourly wages
wi;t across worker groups i of some decomposition (e.g. skilled and unskilled), weighted by the
respective hours shares hi;t = Hi;t=Ht; i.e.
wt =
X
i
wi;thi;t,
where Ht and Hi;t denote total aggregate hours worked and hours worked by group i. Next, we let
xi;t = wi;thi;t be the wage componentof worker group i and compute growth rates of the above
decomposition. We obtain
 logwt  wt   wt 1
wt 1
=
X
i
xi;t 1
wt 1
xi;t   xi;t 1
xi;t 1

X
i
si;t 1 log xi;t,
where si;t 1 = xi;t 1=wt 1 denotes the wage shareof worker group i. Given this decomposition, we
can express the variance of the growth rate of the aggregate real hourly wage as
V ( logwt) =
X
i
X
j
COV (si;t 1 log xi;t; sj;t 1 log xj;t):
To make this variance decomposition operational for our accounting exercise, we assume that wage
shares si;t 1 are approximately constant over the sample under consideration; i.e. si;t 1 = si. For
each of the decompositions, we check this approximation and nd the induced error to be negligible.
This allows us to express the di¤erence in aggregate hourly wage variances over two subsamples
(denoted 1 and 2) as
2w;2   2w;1 =
X
i
X
j
si;2sj;2(xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2  
X
i
X
j
si;1sj;1(xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1,
where 2w;2 denotes the variance of aggregate wage growth V ( logwt) in subsample 2; (xi;2; xj;2) =
COV ( log xi;t; log xj;t)=
p
V ( log xi;t)V ( log xj;t) denotes the correlation coe¢ cient between
wage component of group i and wage component of group j in subsample 2; and so forth for the
other elements. Our objective is to decompose 2w;2   2w;1 into (i) changes in wage shares; (ii)
changes in wage volatilities across worker groups; (iii) changes in hours share volatilities across
worker groups; and (iv) changes in correlation coe¢ cients. As the above expression shows, this
is not straightforward because the di¤erent moments enter both additively and multiplicatively.
Consider rst the contribution of changes in wage shares versus the contribution of changes in
covariances of the wage components (which captures the remaining three changes). By adding and
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substracting di¤erent elements, we can expand the above expression as
2w;2   2w;1 =
X
i
X
j
si;2sj;2

(xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2   (xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1

+
X
i
X
j
[si;2sj;2   si;1sj;1] (xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1.
This decomposes the change in the variance of aggregate wages into changes in wage shares given
covariances of wage components of the rst subsample and changes in covariances of wage compo-
nents given wage shares of the second subsample. Alternatively, we can expand the above expression
as
2w;2   2w;1 =
X
i
X
j
[si;2sj;2   si;1sj;1](xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2
+
X
i
X
j
si;1sj;1

(xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2   (xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1

.
In this way, we decompose the change in the variance of aggregate wages into changes in covariances
of wage components given wage shares of the rst subsample and changes in wage shares given
covariances of wage components of the second subsample. Since there is no particular economic
justication to prefer one expansion over the other, we take the average over the two and obtain
2w;2   2w;1 =
X
i
X
j

si;2sj;2 + si;1sj;1
2
 
(xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2   (xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1

+
X
i
X
j

(xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2 + (xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1
2

[si;2sj;2   si;1sj;1] :
This averaging over two di¤erent extremes is obviously an arbitrary choice. We nd, however, that
all of our robust are robust if we used instead one of the two extremes.
We are left with the decomposition of changes in covariances of wage components into changes of
variances and correlation coe¢ cients of average hourly wages and hoursshares. We can express any
covariance between wage components of worker group i and j as (xi; xj)xixj = (wi; wj)wiwj+
(hi; hj)hihj + 2(wi; hj)wihj . Applying the same averaging over the two possible expansions
to this expression (see the appendix for details), we obtain the following nal decomposition of
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aggregate wage variances over two subsamples20
2w;2   2w;1 =
X
i
X
j
[si;2sj;2 + si;1sj;1]
2
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
"
(wi;2;wj;2)+(wi;1;wj;1)
2
 
wi;2wj;2   wi;1wj;1

+
(wi;2;hj;2)+(wi;1;hj;1)
2
hj;2+hj;1
2
(wi;2   wi;1)
#(1)
+
"
(hi;2;hj;2)+(hi;1;hj;1)
2
 
hi;2hj;2   hi;1hj;1

+
(wi;2;hj;2)+(wi;1;hj;1)
2
wi;2+wi;1
2
(hj;2   hj;1)
#(2)
+h
2
wi;2hj;2+wi;1hj;1
2
[(wi;2; hj;2)  (wi;1; hj;1)]
i(3)
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
+
X
i
X
j

(xi;2; xj;2)xi;2xj;2 + (xi;1; xj;1)xi;1xj;1
2

[si;2sj;2   si;1sj;1](4) .
Part (1) is the portion of the change in the variance of aggregate wages accounted for by changes
in wage volatility of di¤erent worker groups; part (2) is the portion accounted for by changes
in the volatility of hours shares; part (3) is the portion accounted for by changes in correlations
coe¢ cients across hourly wages and hours shares; and part (4) is unchanged from before, measuring
the portion of the change in the variance of aggregate wages accounted for by compositional changes
in the workforce as measured by the di¤erence in wage shares.
The proposed accounting exercise can be implemented for the di¤erence in absolute variances
of aggregate wages (described above) as well as for the di¤erence in relative variances of aggregate
wages; i.e. 2w;2=
2
y;2  2w;1=2y;1. For the latter, we simply divide each second moment term by 2y;2
or 2y;1, respectively. Note that this leaves the di¤erence in wage shares unchanged, which turns out
to be important for the results.
Tables 7 and 8 show the results of our accounting exercise, both for the change in absolute
volatility of aggregate wages (i.e. 2w;2   2w;1) and the change in relative volatility of aggregate
wages (i.e. 2w;2=
2
y;2 2w;1=2y;1). All results are for HP ltered data. In other words, we substitute
growth rates of hourly wages and hoursshares by their respective HP business cycle component.
This approximation holds extremely well.21
As Table 7 shows, compositional changes account for more than 100% of the increase in the
absolute volatility of aggregate wages for all four decompositions discussed in Section 3.2. The
contributions of changes in wage volatility, hours share volatility and correlation coe¢ cients, by
contrast, di¤er wildly across decompositions. This variation in results should not come as a surprise.
20Note that for i = j, (wi; wj)wiwj simplies to 
2
wi , and (hi; hj)hihj simplies to 
2
hi
Hence, our variance
decomposition contains both variances and correlation coe¢ cients. The form of this decomposition is similar to the
one proposed in McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kahn et al. (2002) or Stiroh (2009) for other macro aggregates.
However, our decomposition is complicated by the fact that the sum of log hourly wages of di¤erent worker groups
does not equal the log of aggregate hourly wages.
21Coen-Pirani and Castro (2008) use the same approximation in their decomposition of hours volatility.
16
For example, the absolute volatility of wages increases substantially for most groups of the gender
/ skill and the employment status / skill decomposition, but decreases for most groups of the
other two decompositions. As a result, the contribution of changes in wage volatility across worker
groups to the increase in aggregate wage volatility is strongly positive for the gender / skill and the
employment status / skill decompositions, but strongly negative for the other two decompositions.
Similar di¤erences explain the large variations in contributions of changes in hours share volatility
and correlations across the di¤erent decompositions.
The picture is very di¤erent in Table 8 where we display the same accounting exercise for
the change in relative volatility of aggregate wages. Now, for every decomposition, changes in
the relative volatility of wages across worker groups account for the bulk of the increase in the
relative volatility of aggregate wages. Compositional changes and changes in the relative volatility
of hours shares, by contrast, account for no more than 12% (in the employment situation / skill
decomposition). This di¤erence in results is due to the fact that the volatility of wages relative to the
volatility of output increases strongly for almost all worker groups in each of the decompositions
while the change in composition and the change in relative volatility of hours share is generally
modest.
3.4 Additional evidence from individual panel data
The decompositions we consider remain averages for workers with broad characteristics (e.g. male
and skilled). Hence, it could be that the documented increase in relative wage volatility is the
result of compositional changes within the di¤erent worker groups considered.22 However, starting
with Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994), di¤erent papers using panel data show that income has become
considerably more volatile (in absolute terms) on an individual level as well. Dynan et al. (2008)
provide an extensive review of this literature and document, using data from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), that this increase in individual income volatility (i) occurred within
each major age and education group; (ii) stems to a large part from an frequency of large income
changes rather than changes throughout the income distribution; and (iii) is predominantly due to
increased volatility in labor earnings per hour. Jensen and Shore (2008) extend the analysis of the
PSID data and nd that most of this increase in income volatility can be attributed to individuals
with the most volatile incomes, identied ex-ante by high income changes in the past. For the other
individuals, income volatility has remained more or less constant.
22Unfortunately, the CPS data does not allow us to discard this possibility because the same individual appears
only for two periods of four months, separated by eight consecutive months during which the individual is left out
of the survey.
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Our results based on CPS data are consistent with Dynan et al. (2008) and Jensen and Shore
(2008) in the sense that we nd substantial heterogeneity about the change in absolute wage volatil-
ity across the di¤erent decompositions.23 Compositional changes within worker groups may play
some role for this heterogeneity. At the same time, these panel studies report that individual in-
come volatility has either increased or remained roughly constant. Since the volatility of output
fell by about 60% during the same time period, the volatility of income relative to the volatility of
output must have increased substantially. This is entirely consistent with the conclusions from our
accounting exercise that the across-the-board increase in relative wage volatility is the main source
of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages. The challenge is to come up with a
theory that rationalizes both the drop in the volatility of output and the relatively modest changes
in the magnitude of wage uctuations across di¤erent workers groups.
4 Wage volatility in general equilibrium
To assess the potential of di¤erent explanations for the change in relative wage volatility, we build a
small DSGE model with real wage rigidity. The model is similar to the one presented in Blanchard
and Gali (2007) who use it to analyze the implications of wage rigidity for optimal monetary policy.
We use the model instead to rst explore to what extent changes outside of the labor market are
capable of generating the observed increase in relative wage volatility. Second, we consider the
quantitative e¤ects of changing the degree of wage rigidity on wage dynamics and the economy in
general.24
The model is set in a representative agent framework. We thus see our exercise rst and foremost
as an account of aggregate labor market dynamics. However, the e¤ects of changes in wage rigidity
that we highlight below apply equally to specic labor markets (e.g. the labor market for skilled
workers in a given industry). As such, we consider our exploration also as a general rst pass at
explaining why the relative volatility of wages has increased substantially for most worker groups.
23Given that the panel dimension is absent in the CPS data, it is di¢ cult to compare our results further with the
results from PSID studies. Since our data is topcoded (thus missing some of the increase in large income changes
noted by Dynan et al., 2008), and self-employed workers (which play an important role in Jensen and Shores 2008
analysis) are dropped, our estimates of the evolution of wage volatility are likely to be on the conservative side.
24Gourio (2007), in an unpublished note, proposes a similar model to analyze the e¤ects of changes in the degree
of wage rigidity. His calibration and analysis is more limited, however.
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4.1 Model
Since most of the model is standard, we keep the exposition to a minimum and refer the reader to
the appendix for a full description. In the following, upper-case variables denote observed macroeco-
nomic quantities and lower-case variables denote percent deviations from appropriately transformed
steady states.
The economy is populated by 3 types of agents: a continuum of identical worker-households, a
continuum of identical rms and a monetary authority. Households discount time at rate  and
have preferences over consumption and leisure. Period t utility is given by
Zt 1
"
logCt   N
1+
t
1 + 
#
, (1)
where Ct and Nt are a composite consumption good and hours worked, respectively; Zt 1 is an
exogenous preference shock; and 1= > 0 denotes the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Households
maximize present discounted utility by choosing consumption, hours worked, and investment in
either physical capital Kt+1   (1  )Kt or nominal bonds Bt+1 subject to the budget constraint
Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt + Bt+1
Rnt Pt
 WtNt +RKt Kt +
Bt
Pt
+Dt, (2)
where Wt, RKt and R
n
t are the real wage rate, the real net rental rate of capital, and the gross
nominal bond return, respectively; Pt is the aggregate price level; and Dt are dividends from a
perfectly diversied portfolio of claims to rms.
Each rm produces a di¤erentiated good with constant returns to scale technology
Yt = F (Kt; AtNt), (3)
where At denotes an exogenous labor-augmenting technology shock. The di¤erent rmsgoods are
combined into the nal composite good according to the Kimball (1995) aggregator.25 Hence, each
rm is a monopolistic competitor, maximizing prots subject to a downward-sloping demand curve.
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to the following rule
Rnt = (R
n
t 1)
 (t)
(1 ) (Yt=Yt 1)(1 )y , (4)
where t denotes the gross ination rate of the composite goods price, and Yt=Yt 1 is the growth
rate of aggregate output.
25Kimballs (1995) aggregator is a generalization of the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and provides exibility in mapping
micro data on price adjustment to aggregate ination dynamics. See, for example, Eichenbaum and Fischer (2007).
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We impose two market frictions for the determination of equilibrium allocations. First, as is
common in the New Keynesian literature, we assume that price setting is staggered following Calvo
(1983), with each rm facing a constant probability in any given period of being able to reoptimize
its price. This implies a loglinearized New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) for ination
t = Ett+1 + mct, (5)
withmct denoting real marginal cost. The slope coe¢ cient  in this equation is a nonlinear function
of price setting and demand parameters (see, for example, Eichenbaum and Fischer, 2007).26
Second, we posit as in Blanchard and Gali (2007) that real wages adjust sluggishly according to
the following loglinear wage setting curve
wt = wt 1 + (1  )mrst, (6)
where mrst denotes the workersmarginal rate of substitution
mrst = ct + nt. (7)
Given this wage, rms hire labor to satisfy their optimality condition
wt = mct + yt   nt. (8)
In words, wages are assumed to be fully allocative but for some unmodelled friction, workers are
not on their labor supply schedule as dened by the marginal rate of substitution. This formulation
of the labor market is admittedly ad-hoc. Yet, there are several reasons for proceeding in this way.
First, the simple form of the labor market allows for a straightforward analysis of the e¤ects of
increased wage exibility. Second, the next section discusses evidence suggesting that wages indeed
play an allocative role over the business cycle. Third, very similar formulations can be derived
from more explicit environments; for example (i) an environment with unions that formulate wage
demands according to a partial adjustment process (e.g. Blanchard and Gali, 2007); (ii) a model
with unobserved ability where rms pay performance-based wages to a fraction of the workforce
(e.g. Lemieux et al., 2008); or (iii) an e¢ ciency wage setup where workers evaluate the fairness of
a given wage o¤er by comparing it to their past wage (e.g. Danthine and Kurmann, 2009). Fourth,
very similar formulations of wage rigidity are introduced in search-based models of the labor market,
motivated by the same type of fairness considerations (e.g. Hall, 2005 and Shimer, 2005). These
26Alternatively, we could have left prices completely exible in which case the model collapses to the RBC bench-
mark. None of the main results below are a¤ected by this simplication. However, it would imply that wages and
labor productivity share exactly the same loglinear dynamics, which is not the case in the data.
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search-based models have many advantages compared to the present stylized model.27 As we discuss
below, however, changes in wage rigidity turn out to be as crucial for search-based models as they
are for our more stylized formulation to match observed changes in relative wage volatility.
For capital markets, we keep the competitive markets assumption. The households rst-order
condition for investment in physical capital is
ct = Etct+1   rkEtrkt+1  zt (9)
and the rms demand for capital is
rkt = mct + yt   kt. (10)
Likewise, the household rst-order condition for investment in nominal bonds is
ct = Etct+1   (rnt   Ett+1) zt, (11)
As is clear from both (9) and (11), the preference shock plays a similar role than a credit shock
that drives a wedge between market returns and the intertemporal rate of substitution. Everything
else constant, an increase in zt lowers current consumption, which in turn lowers mrst and wt
(depending on the degree of wage rigidity ).
4.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model to quarterly data. Except for the degree of wage rigidity , the di¤erent
model parameters are kept constant for all simulations and are set as follows.
Calibrated model parameters
   1=  r  y
0.333 0.987 0.025 1.000 0.100 0.800 2.000 0.200
The values of ;  and  are standard (e.g. King and Rebelo, 2000). The unit elasticity of labor
supply is a compromise between the values suggested in the micro and macro literature. The
remaining 4 parameters are calibrated in line with estimates from New Keynesian models. The
value of the NKPC slope coe¢ cient  lies between the estimates found in limited information
studies such as Gali and Gertler (1999) or Kurmann (2007) and the full-information estimates from
27Aside from providing a clear denition of unemployment and labor market ows, search-based models have the
appealing theoretical property that wage rigidities are not necessarily ine¢ cient. In the present formulation, by
contrast, we need to appeal to unspecied costs that prevent workers and rms from renegotiating wages until the
marginal rate of substitution equals marginal productivity of labor.
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medium-scale macro models such as Smets and Wouters (2007). The monetary policy parameters
are close to the ones estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the 1957-2004 period.
For the shock calibration, we also follow the literature and let the technology shock and the
preference shock follow independent AR(1) processes
at = aat 1 + "at with "at iid (0; 
2
"a)
zt = zzt 1 + "zt with "zt iid (0; 
2
"z
)
We estimate the two parameters for each process directly from the data. For the technology shock
process, we use a quarterly approximation of the total factor productivity measure constructed by
Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), which controls for variable factor utilization. We convert this
measure into logarithms, subtract a linear trend and then estimate a and "a by ordinary least
squares (OLS).28 For the preference shock process, we measure zt as the residual from the Euler
equation for nominal bonds in (11); i.e. zt = Etct+1   (rnt   Ett+1).29 The nominal short-rate
in this equation is measured by the 3-month treasury bill rate. Expectations of future consumption
growth and ination are estimated from a bivariate VAR in the two variables, with consumption
being measured by real chain-weighted per capita expenditures of non-durables and services and
ination being measured by the growth rate of the GDP deator.30 As for total factor productivity,
we subtract a linear trend from the obtained series of zt and then estimate z and "z by OLS.
We limit the rst observation for all data series to 1953:2 because Treasury bill rates were not
market-determined until the 1951 Treasury-Fed Accord, and because we want to avoid the extreme
swings in ination during the Korean War period. The point estimates for the pre-1984 and the
28Substracting a linear trend implies that total factor productivity has a deterministic exponential growth rate, as
assumed for example in King and Rebelo (2000). Our results are robust when we apply a higher-order detrending
procedure.
29Alternatively, we could measure zt as the residual from the investment Euler equation in (9). There are two
reasons we prefer the bond Euler equation. First, the rental rate of capital in the investment Euler equation has to
be inferred from macroeconomic quantities using the rms capital demand condition in (10). Both the real marginal
cost and capital stocks are di¢ cult to measure and thus, we have less condence in the resulting series for the rental
rate of capital than bond prices and ination, which are directly observable in the data. Second, the investment
Euler equation may be a¤ected by investment-specic technology shocks. Primiceri et al. (2006) argue that such
investment-specic shocks neutralize a large part of preference shocks, which would lead to a substantially smoother
series for zt. These investment-specic shocks do not enter into the bond Euler equation.
30Based on SchwarzBayesian Information Criterion (BIC), we select a VAR in 5 lags. The di¤erent results are
robust to alternative lag specications.
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post-1984 period are31
Estimated driving processes
a "a z "z
pre-1984 0.9788 0.0094 0.7956 0.0033
post-1984 0.9738 0.0057 0.8951 0.0020
Both shock processes become less volatile in the post-1984 period by about 40%. This drop in
volatility of exogenous driving forces is robust across many di¤erent model and shock specications
(e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) and provides the basis of the good luck hypothesisof the Great
Moderation, a point to which we return below. For the baseline calibration, we set the di¤erent
shock parameters to their pre-1984 estimates and then vary them later to their post-1984 estimates.
The nal parameter we need to calibrate is the degree of wage rigidity . Since the wage setting
equation in (6) is reduced-form, we cannot calibrate it based on micro evidence. We thus set  such
that the model calibrated with the above parameter values and shock estimates for the pre-1984
period matches the standard deviation of HP ltered output. This yields a value of  = 0:85,
implying that the pre-1984 period was characterized by a substantial degree of wage rigidity.
4.3 Simulations
We compute several simulations of the model to illustrate the importance of increased exibility
in wage setting. First, we discuss how model under the baseline calibration matches salient labor
market dynamics in the pre-1984 period. Second, we assess to what extent a reduction in the
volatility of exogenous shocks can generate an increase in the relative volatility of wages. Third,
we consider the e¤ects of lowering the degree of wage rigidity by setting  = 0:15 while keeping
the shock processes at their pre-1984 calibration. This decrease in wage rigidity is motivated in
part by direct evidence from Kahn (1997) who uses PSID data to show that the frequency of wage
adjustments has increased over the past decades. Furthermore, we discuss in the next section
di¤erent sources that may have led to this type of increase in wage exibility. At the same time,
neither Kahns (1997) study nor the evidence discussed in the next section allows us to conclude
that wage setting has become almost completely exible as implied by  = 0:15. Rather, we want
to assess with this simulation the extent to which increased wage exibility is capable of a¤ecting
labor market dynamics.32 Fourth, we keep  = 0:15 and adapt the shock calibration to the post-84
31For both sub-periods, the correlation between the innovations is negligible (0.11 and -0.03, respectively). Hence,
our assumption that the two shock processes are independent is valid.
32Notice that the simulation results presented below change only little for values between  = 0:3 and  = 0.
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estimates so as to assess how changes in the relative importance of shocks interact with increased
wage exibility.
While the main focus of our investigation is to quantify the potential of increased wage exibility
to generate the observed increase in relative volatility of wages, we are also interested in assessing
whether our theory can replicate other prominent changes in labor market dynamics. As noted in
the introduction, the Great Moderation period is also characterized by an increase in the relatively
volatility of hours worked and a fall in the correlation of labor productivity with output and hours.33
The rst three columns of Table 9 document these changes. The volatility of both hours and
labor productivity has increased relative to output. However, this increase in relative volatility
is far smaller than the relative increase in volatility of aggregate wages. The correlation of labor
productivity with output has turned from robustly positive to zero whereas the correlation with
hours has turned substantially negative. A similar development applies to wages, which have become
mildly negatively correlated.
Baseline calibration
Simulation 1 in Table 9 displays the second moments generated by the model for our baseline
calibration with  = 0:85 and the shock processes set to their pre-1984 estimates. As discussed
above, the degree of wage rigidity is chosen such that the model matches the pre-1984 volatility of
output in the data. Despite its simplicity, the model does a surprisingly good job in matching other
pre-1984 data moments. In particular, the model generates a relative volatility and correlation
coe¢ cient of wages that is only slightly above the values in the data. The relative volatility of labor
productivity and its correlation with output and hours are also close to their data counterparts.
Smaller shocks
We now change the calibration of the two shock processes to their post-1984 estimates while
keeping all of the other parameters at their baseline values. This is the good luck hypothesisof
the Great Moderation, proposed by Stock and Watson (2003) or Sims and Zha (2006) among many
others, which says that most of the decrease in business cycle volatility in the post-1984 period can
be attributed to smaller shocks. As Simulation 2 in Table 9 shows, the smaller estimates of the two
shock processes leads to a substantial fall in output volatility of about 40% as well as a fall in the
cyclicality of wages and labor productivity. Hence, the good luck hypothesisis quite powerful in
accounting for the Great Moderation and is consistent with some of the changes in labor market
dynamics highlighted by Stiroh (2009), Barnichon (2008) and Gali and Gambetti (2009). At the
same time, the decrease in shock volatility in the post-1984 period leads to a substantial fall in the
volatility of wages such that the relative volatility of aggregate wages hardly changes. The good
33See Barnichon (2008), Gali and Gambetti (2009) and Stiroh (2009).
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luck hypothesison its own thus fails to account for the sizable increase in the relative volatility of
wages that we observe in the data.
To understand these results, it is useful to consider a graphical illustration of the labor market.
Figure 2a depicts the response of wage setting (6) and labor demand (8) to a positive technology
shock in the w  n space. Starting from point A, the technology shock moves labor demand to the
right and shifts up the wage setting curve due to the positive income e¤ect. Because of consumption
smoothing, this income e¤ect is relatively modest. A high degree of wage rigidity (i.e.  = 0:85)
thus implies that wages adapt slowly and rms increase labor input (and production) by a lot, as
depicted by the move to equilibrium point B. Smaller technology shocks change the absolute but
not relative size of the shifts in the two curves. The magnitude of adjustments in w compared
to n (and output) thus remain more or less unchanged.34 Figure 3a illustrates the e¤ect of a
preference shock on labor demand and wage setting. Everything else constant, the preference shock
reduces current consumption, which implies a negative income e¤ect that shifts down the wage
setting curve. Aside from negligible e¤ects from dynamic capital adjustments (not shown here),
the labor demand schedule remains una¤ected and thus, the economy adjusts from point A to its
new equilibrium at point B. Similar to the technology shock, smaller preference shocks result in
smaller shifts of the wage setting curve. But as long as the degree of wage rigidity and the wage
elasticity of labor demand remain unchanged, the relative magnitude of adjustments in w and n
remain more or less the same. This explains why changes in technology and preference shocks
have hardly any e¤ect on the relative volatility of wages. By contrast, changes in technology and
preference shocks may have important e¤ects on the cyclicality of wages and labor productivity.
As the two gures reveal, technology shocks imply that both wages and labor productivity co-move
with hours, whereas preference shocks imply exactly the opposite. When preference shocks become
relatively more important, the correlation of wages and labor productivity with hours (and thus
output) falls and may even become negative. As Simulation 2 in Table 9 shows, this is exactly what
happens in our model for the post-1984 estimates of the two shocks.
The graphical illustration suggests that similar conclusions apply for other exogenous shocks
that shift either the wage setting curve or the labor demand but do not a¤ect their respective wage
elasticities. Likewise, structural changes outside of the labor market (e.g. changes in monetary
policy) should have only a negligible impact on the relative volatility of wages. We assess this
conjecture with the larger DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) that contains several real and
nominal frictions and seven di¤erent exogenous shocks.35 We rst simulate the model using the
34Our explanation ignores dynamic e¤ects coming through movements in capital stocks. Since capital stocks move
slowly over the business cycle and account for a relatively small part of production, these e¤ects are negligible.
35Specically, the Smets-Wouters model features sticky nominal price and wage setting that allows for indexation to
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estimates for the 1966-1979 period reported by Smets and Wouters and then change the calibration
of the seven exogenous shock processes to their 1984-2004 estimates (keeping all other parameters
constant). The HP-ltered volatility of output drops from 1.82 to 1.26, thus conrming the good
luck hypothesisof the Great Moderation. At the same time, the volatility of real wages falls from
0.84 to 0.79, implying an increase in relative wage volatility from 0:45 to 0:62. While this increase is
somewhat larger than for the more stylized DSGE model above, it remains far from the increase in
relative wage volatility observed in the data. Furthermore, when we change the calibration of the
monetary policy rule in the Smets-Wouters model from the 1966-1979 estimates to the 1984-2004
estimates, we nd that the impact on the relative volatility of wages is very small.36 We therefore
conclude that the observed increase in relative wage volatility is unlikely to come from changes
outside the labor market (e.g. smaller exogenous shocks or di¤erent monetary policy).
Increased wage exibility
To assess the e¤ects of increased wage exibility in isolation, we reset the calibration of the
shock processes in our small DSGE model to their pre-1984 estimates and reduce instead the degree
of wage rigidity from  = 0:85 to  = 0:15. As Simulation 3 in Table 9 shows, this simple increase
in wage exibility is capable of generating a substantial increase in the relative volatility of wages.
More specically, the increase in relative wage volatility is due to a modest increase in the absolute
volatility of wages (not shown) and a drop in output volatility of about 35%. Hence, the increase in
wage exibility not only leads to an increase in wage volatility but also implies smaller business cycle
uctuations. At the same time, the increase in wage exibility leads to a counterfactual increase in
the correlations of wages and labor productivity with output and hours.
As before, it is useful to consider a graphical illustration to understand the mechanisms behind
these results. Figure 2b depicts the impact of a positive technology shock in a labor market with
high and low degrees of wage exibility. The low wage exbility case (i.e.  = 0:85) is exactly the
same case than in Figure 2a; i.e. a positive technology shock shifts out the labor demand curve and
the economy moves along a relatively at wage setting curve from point A to point B. Under exible
lagged ination, external habit persistence in consumption, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization
and xed costs in production. The exogenous shocks are a TFP shock, an investment-specic technology shock, a
government spending shock, a labor supply shock, an intertemporal preference shock, a price markup shock, and a
monetary policy shock. We simulate a loglinearized version of the model using the DYNARE code that Smets and
Wouters supply on the AER website.
36Clarida et al. (2000) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) among others argue that starting in the 1980s, U.S.
monetary policy has become substantially more aggressive with respect to ination. However, estimates by Smets
and Wouters (2007) contradict this result. In our small DSGE model as well as in the Smets-Wouters model, we nd
that changes in the monetary policy response to ination have have only a small impact on output volatility and do
not matter for the relative volatility of wages.
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wages (i.e.  = 0:15), the reaction of wages to increased labor demand is much stronger because
the elasticity of labor supply and the equilibrium income e¤ect of larger consumption now both
play a more important role. Firms thus increase labor input and production by a much smaller
amount and the labor market moves to point C. The equilibrium response of wages relative to
the equilibrium response of hours thus increases as wages become more exible. Furthermore, the
correlation of wages with output conditional on technology shocks increases with wage exibility
because the reaction of wages becomes more contemporaneous. Likewise, the conditional correlation
of labor productivity with output and hours increases with wage exibility because productivity
shocks a¤ect output proportionally more than hours (due to decreasing returns to scale of hours in
production).37
Figure 3b depicts the impact of a positive preference shock with relatively rigid and relatively
exible wage setting. We start again at point A. Under rigid wage setting, the income e¤ect of the
preference shock is small because changes in the marginal rate of substitution exert only a limited
e¤ect on wage setting. Hence, the economy ends up at new equilibrium point B, as in Figure
3a, where wages and labor adjust relatively little. Under exible wages, the income e¤ect is much
larger. As long as the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is su¢ ciently high (i.e. the wage setting curve
is not too steep), the economy ends up at point C where the response of both wages and hours
is larger compared to point B. Based on this condition, increased wage exibility leads to larger
movements in both wages and hours. Furthermore, larger shifts in the wage setting curve make
wages more countercyclical conditional on preference shocks and labor productivity less procyclical
(due to decreasing returns to scale of hours in production).
Increased wage exibility and smaller shocks
The above results suggest that an increase in the relative importance of preference shocks brings
the model implications of increased wage exibility closer to the data with respect to the cyclicality
of wages and labor productivity. To assess this conjecture, we keep  = 0:15 (as in Simulation 3)
and change the calibration of the two shock processes to their post-1984 estimates (as in Simulation
2). As Simulation 4 in Table 9 shows, the change in shock processes together with increased wage
exibility leads to a substantial decrease in the correlation of wages and labor productivity with
output and hours. At the same time, output volatility falls slightly below the observed volatility
in the post-1984 period. Increased wage exibility together with the decrease in shock volatilities
37We perform a similar exercise in the larger DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) where increased wage
exibility takes to form of a higher frequency at which households can reoptimize their nominal wage (keeping
everything else constant). This leads to a sizeable decrease in output volatility and a large increase in relative wage
volatility, thus conrming the results of our smaller DSGE model. Details are available from the authors upon
request.
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can therefore account for the entire drop in output volatility during the Great Moderation. The
decrease in correlations is not su¢ cient to match the labor market dynamics observed in the post-
1984 data. Given the stylized nature of our model, this should not come as a big surprise. In
particular, any additional shock that a¤ects the marginal rate of substitution (e.g. a labor supply
shock or a government spending shock) would further decrease the cyclicality of wages and labor
productivity, thus pushing the model implications in the right direction.
We take away three main lessons from the simulations.
1. Changes in exogenous shock processes have substantial impact on the absolute volatility and
cyclicality of wages and hours but they cannot account for the observed increase in relative
wage volatility. Likewise, structural changes outside of the labor market (i.e. changes that
do not directly a¤ect the elasticity of wage setting or labor demand) are an unlikely source of
large changes in relative wage volatility.
2. Increased wage exibility makes wages more volatile relative to output, independent of the
shock.
3. Increased wage exibility in combination with a decrease in the importance of shocks that
shift labor demand (e.g. technology shocks) relative to shocks that shift the labor supply
(e.g. preference shocks) allows the model despite its simplicity to account for a surprising
fraction of the observed changes in the cyclicality of di¤erent labor market variables.
5 Sources of increased wage exibility
The U.S. labor market has undergone several important changes over the past 25 years that are
likely to have led to increased exibility in wage setting. In this section, we focus on two potential
sources: deunionization and the shift towards performance-pay contracts. We rst compare the
evolution of these characteristics to the evolution of aggregate wage volatility. Then, we discuss
theoretical and empirical work of how changes in these labor market characteristics may lead to
increased wage exibility. Finally, we discuss an alternative theory by Gali and Van Rens (2009)
who argue that increased wage exibility can be explained by a reduction in search frictions.
5.1 Structural changes in the U.S. labor market
In Figure 4, we plot the evolution of unionization and performance-pay contracts and compare
the two measures to the evolution of relative volatility of aggregate wages (HP ltered, centered
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8-year rolling windows). The two top panels show the di¤erent time series. The two bottom
panels show scatter plots of each labor market measure against the relative standard deviation of
aggregate wages. Unionization measures the fraction of individuals working under a union contract,
as computed from our CPS data. The measure of performance pay, in turn, is taken from Lemieux
et al. (2008) and represents the proportion of male household heads whose total compensation
included a variable pay component (bonus, commission, or piece-rate) at least once during the
employment relationship.
As the left panel of Figure 4 shows, unionization has decreased substantially over the past
decades, from about 27% in the early 1970s to 12% in 2006, with a large part of this decrease
occurring in the rst half of the 1980s.38 The decline in unionization is well-documented in the
literature and is more pronounced for private-sector workers. The majority of unionized jobs are
now concentrated in the public administration sector (e.g. in 2008, union density was 7.6% in the
private sector compared to 37% in the public administration sector).39 Interestingly, as we pointed
out in Section 3, public administration workers are among the very few groups for which wage
volatility has decreased substantially in the post-1984 period.
The right panel displays the incidence of performance-pay contracts. As for deunionization, the
shift towards performance-pay contracts increases sharply during the early 1980s and continues,
although at a lower pace, during the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s. The literature has
suggested several underlying forces for this tendency towards compensation schemes with explicit
performance clauses. Among them are better management techniques, increased competition due
to lower entry barriers and globalization (e.g. Cunat and Guadalupe, 2005).
As the four panels of Figure 4 show, the di¤erent changes in labor market characteristics roughly
coincide with the evolution of relative wage volatility. Both the deunionization of the workforce and
the shift towards performance-pay contracts accelerates in the early 1980s as aggregate wages start
to become more volatile relative to output. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the decrease
in unionization and the increase in performance-pay contracts slow down, the relative volatility of
aggregate wages stabilizes at a higher level. Finally, in the mid-1990s, there is another marked but
temporary increase in the relative volatility of wages, which coincides with a further reduction in
38Many observers relate this fall in unionization to Reagans negative reaction to the air tra¢ c controller strike in
1981. For example, Farber and Western (2002) document that new certication elections dropped precipitously in the
early 1980s. Other possible explanations are the change in employment towards industries where union organization
is more expensive; increased competition among rms that reduce appropriable rents and thus the potential benets
of unions; and skill-biased technology change that makes union-induced wage compression more di¢ cult to sustain.
See Acemoglu et al. (2001).
39See See Faber andWestern (2002) as well as Hirsch and Macphersons (2003) website http://www.unionstats.com.
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unionization but is not matched by a further increase in performance-pay contracts.
5.2 Consequences for wage exibility
We now discuss how deunionization and a shift towards performance-pay contracts may map into
our concept of increased wage exibility as described by a reduction of  in (6). Consider rst the
e¤ects of a decrease in unionization. Unions typically negotiate wage contracts for several years
ahead and index the contracts to ination. As Blanchard and Gali (2007) show, such contracts
with indexation lead to a staggered real wage structure that is similar in form to the wage setting
equation in (6). A decrease in unionization in such an environment is equivalent to a shortening in
contract length for the average worker, thus implying a fall in  under the condition that wages of
non-unionized workers are more responsive to current economic events.
A shift towards performance-pay contracts has similar consequences for aggregate wage setting
provided that xed-wage contracts are set in advance whereas performance-pay contracts are a
function of observed outcomes. Lemieux et al. (2008) illustrate this implication in a simple model
with ex-ante unobserved ability where rms endogenously choose between the two types of contracts
depending on monitoring costs and the conditional variance of ability. Alternatively, consider an
e¢ ciency wage set-up where rms have the choice to elicit e¤ort either through a monitoring-and-
punishment scheme i.e. the shirking story of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or by paying a fair
wage such that workers reciprocate with a commensurate level of e¤ort i.e. the fair wage story of
Akerlof (1982). According to the shirking story, incentive-compatible wages are typically a function
of current variables (e.g. Danthine and Donaldson, 1990; or Alexopoulos, 2004). According to
the fair wage story, prot-maximizing wages are a function of the reference (or norm) that workers
consider as fair. As Bewley (2002) emphasizes in his survey on pay practices, this reference is tightly
linked to past wages because "...employees usually have little notion of a fair or market value for
their services and quickly come to believe that they are entitled to their existing wage, no matter
how high it may be..." (page 7).40 An increase in the incidence of performance-pay contracts in
such an e¢ ciency wage set-up corresponds to a move away from a fair-wage labor market towards
a monitoring / no-shirking labor market where lagged wage references are no longer important. In
terms of our wage-setting equation in (6), this would imply a fall in .
While it seems reasonable to assume that both the decrease in unionization and the shift towards
performance-pay contracts increase wage exibility on the aggregate level (i.e. a lower ), it is not
necessarily the case that these changes lead to more volatile wages in equilibrium. This all depends
40See Collard and De la Croix (2000) or Danthine and Kurmann (2009) for a modern macroeconomic analysis of
the implications of fair wages based on a lagged wage reference.
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on whether wages of workers in non-union jobs and on performance-pay contracts are more volatile
than wages of their counterparts in unionized jobs and on xed-wage contracts. This question
is addressed in the study by Lemieux et al. (2008) mentioned above. Using PSID data, they
show that wages are most responsive to local labor market shocks (as measured by changes in
local unemployment rates) for non-union workers covered by performance-pay schemes, and least
responsive for union workers who are not paid for performance. Interestingly, the exact opposite
is the case for hours of work, which suggests that wages play an allocative role over the business
cycle, as assumed in our model.
The evidence in this section shows that the timing of deunionization and the shift towards
performance-pay contracts coincides surprisingly well with the observed increase in aggregate wage
volatility. In addition, there are several theoretical and empirical arguments why this common
tendency may not just be an coincidence.
5.3 Labor hoarding and smaller search frictions
In a recent paper, Gali and Van Rens (2009) explore an alternative explanation based on labor
hoarding and search frictions to account for the observed changes in labor market dynamics. The
main focus of their paper is on explaining the increase in the relative volatility of employment and
the fall in the correlation of labor productivity with output and hours. Their hypothesis is that a
decline in search frictions over the past decades has lead to a decrease in unobserved work e¤ort
variations (i.e. a decrease in labor hoarding).41 As a result, labor productivity has become less
procyclical and the relative volatility of employment has increased, as observed in the data. As
long as wages are determined by Nash bargaining, however, the decline in search frictions leads to a
decrease rather than an increase in the relative volatility of wages. This result justies our decision
to abstract from search frictions as a rst pass: without appealing to some form of change in the
wage setting process, search-based models of the labor market are equally incapable of generating
the observed large increase in relative wage volatility than competitive models.
Based on this insight, Gali and Van Rens (2009) impose a wage setting process that is similar
in form to ours but where the degree of wage rigidity  is a reduced-form function of the bargaining
set implied by the search friction. A decline in search frictions narrows the bargaining set and thus
leads to an increase in wage exibility. Simulations with di¤erent functional forms for  show that
under certain conditions, this mechanism may generate an increase in aggregate wage volatility as
well as a modest decrease in business cycle uctuations.
41This result follows readily from the assumption that e¤ort per worker has stronger diminishing returns to pro-
duction and stronger increasing disutility than employment.
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Gali and Van Rens (2009) explanation for the increase in aggregate wage volatility is very
di¤erent from ours. While we argue that wage setting per se has become more exible due to
inherent changes in the way rms and workers negotiate compensation, Gali and Van Rens maintain
that labor adjustments have become less costly and as a consequence, wages must have become more
exible in order to remain privately e¢ cient (i.e. stay inside the bargaining set). From a theoretical
point of view, this mechanism is appealing because it clearly spells out the frictions that have
changed to make wages more exible. From an empirical point of view, however, Gali and Van
Rens (2009)hypothesis of a decline in labor search frictions is refuted by the data. First and
most importantly, their hypothesis predicts that average job nding rates have increased (smaller
search costs increase the equilibrium vacancy-unemployment rate, thus leading to a higher matching
probability for workers). Yet, exactly the opposite has happened in the data: since the 1950s, job
nding rates in the U.S. have uctuated around a steadily decreasing trend (see, for example,
Figure 5 in Shimer, 2005).42 Second, a central and in our view sensible assumption for Gali and
Van Rens (2009)explanation is that in the absence of search frictions, variations on the intensive
labor margin are relatively more costly than variations on the extensive margin. This is why a
decline in search frictions in their model leads to smaller variations in unobservable work e¤ort.
But by exactly the assumption, a decline in search frictions should also lead to smaller variations
in hours per worker; i.e. the volatility of average hours worked relative to the volatility of output
should decrease. In the data, however, the volatility of average hours worked (dened as total hours
divided by employment) decreases only modestly in the post-1984 period. As a result, its volatility
relative to the volatility of output increases by almost 70%.43
We conclude that while Gali and Van Rens(2009) explanation based on a decline in search
frictions is appealing from a theoretical point of view, its predictions for labor market ows and
intensive margin adjustment are contradicted by the data. In fact, while the U.S. labor market
appears to have become more exible in terms of wage setting, it has become more rigid in terms
of employment uctuations at the extensive margin.
42Shimers (2005) job nding rate is computed from unemployment data only and does not depend on vacancy data
(such as the help-wanted index). Fundamental changes in what vacancy data captures are therefore not a concern.
43The H-P ltered standard deviations of average hours for the 1948:1-1983:4 period and the 1984:1-2006:4 periods
are 0.55 and 0.49, respectively. Dividing by the corresponding output volatilities in Table 1 yields relative volatilities
of 0.21 and 0.35, which represents an increase of almost 70%.
32
6 Conclusion
This paper documents that the relative volatility of wages increased by a factor of 2.5 to 3.5 during
the Great Moderation. Most of this increase in relative wage volatility is due to the fact that while
output volatility fell by about 60% during that period, the volatility of aggregate wages remained
constant or even increased modestly. CPS microdata reveals that this relative stability of wage
volatility applies for many di¤erent groups of workers. As a result, the increase in the relative
volatility of aggregate wages is predominantly due to the increase in relative wage volatility across
di¤erent groups workers. Compositional changes of the labor force, by contrast, account for at most
12% of the increase in the relative volatility of aggregate wages.
We view these ndings as an important challenge for macroeconomic modeling in general and
explanations of the Great Moderation in particular. Using a small DSGE model, we show that
changes in the volatility of exogenous shocks are unlikely to generate sizable changes in relative
wage volatility. Similarly, structural changes outside of the labor market are unlikely to a¤ect
relative wage volatility. This puts the labor market front and center. In particular, we argue that
increased exibility in wage setting has a lot of potential to generate the observed increase in the
relative volatility of wages. The main mechanism behind this increase in relative wage volatility is,
as in the data, the drop in output volatility that increased wage exibility generates. This general
equilibrium e¤ect provides at the same time a promising new explanation for the Great Moderation
that has so far been unexplored.
There are many potential sources why wage setting has become more exible over the past
decades. Our model is too stylized to distinguish between di¤erent competing explanations. We ar-
gue, however, that the marked decline in private-sector unionization and the shift towards performance-
pay contracts are promising candidates. In future work, it would be interesting to formally assess
this hypothesis, both by exploiting disaggregate data and by evaluating general equilibrium models
that incorporate more explicit theories of wage setting and labor market frictions.
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Figure 1: Rolling windows of standard deviations (upper panel) and relative standard deviations (lower panel).
Dotted lines represent +/- one standard deviation bands.
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Figure 4: Evolution of union density (left) and performance-pay (right) vs. relative wage volatility.
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      TABLE I
           Changes in Volatility
   Relative
                Standard Deviation     Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 p-value Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84
First-Difference
Output 1.57 0.68 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.11) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage 0.57 0.68 1.26 0.13 0.36 1.01 2.92
(0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12)
HP-Filter
Output 2.65 1.28 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.21) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage 0.63 1.03 1.66 0.00 0.24 0.80 3.38
(0.05) (0.09) (0.02) (0.12)
BP-Filter
Output 2.61 1.17 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.23) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00)
Wage 0.58 0.94 1.62 0.00 0.22 0.80 3.64
(0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12)
       Notes : Total sample extends from 1948:1 to 2006:4 with split in 1984:1. Quarterly data.  P-values are reported for a test of equality of
variances across the two subsamples. Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimates.
              TABLE II
   Changes in Volatility
  Relative
   Standard Deviation     Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84
First-Difference
Output 3.89 1.76 0.45 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.30) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00)
Aggr. Wage (LPC) 0.99 1.49 1.51 0.25 0.85 3.40
(0.15) (0.23) (0.03) (0.18)
Aggr. Wage (PELQ) 0.86 1.33 1.55 0.23 0.75 3.26
(0.05) (0.16) (0.03) (0.20)
NBER manufacturing 1.57 2.20 1.40 0.41 1.15 2.80
(0.09) (0.34) (0.05) (0.25)
CPS Wage 1.12 1.31 1.17 0.29 0.74 2.57
(0.18) (0.19) (0.04) (0.18)
HP-Filter
Output 2.90 1.15 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.19) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00)
Aggr. Wage (LPC) 0.60 0.93 1.55 0.21 0.80 3.81
(0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.13)
Aggr. Wage (PELQ) 0.59 0.80 1.36 0.21 0.78 3.71
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16)
NBER manufacturing 1.15 1.22 1.06 0.40 1.09 2.73
(0.14) (0.17) (0.05) (0.27)
CPS Wage 0.69 0.75 1.09 0.24 0.65 2.71
(0.05) (0.13) (0.03) (0.16)
Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984, except for PELQ wage sample that spans from 1976 to 2000, and the
NBER's manufacturing database sample that spans from 1973 to 2002. Annual data. Standard errors appear in parentheses below estimates.
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             TABLE III
         Evolution of Gender/Skill Wage Components
         Average                      Relative
      Wage Share               Standard Deviation              Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Post/Pre-84
Male unskilled 0.50 0.38  Wage component 1.06 0.86 0.81 0.37 0.74 2.02
  Wage 0.76 0.80 1.06 0.26 0.70 2.69
  Hours share 0.67 0.32 0.47 0.23 0.27 1.17
Male skilled 0.20 0.24  Wage component 2.22 1.27 0.57 0.79 1.10 1.43
  Wage 0.51 0.93 1.82 0.18 0.81 4.54
  Hours share 1.88 0.63 0.34 0.65 0.55 0.85
Female unskilled 0.23 0.24  Wage component 0.89 0.85 0.95 0.31 0.74 2.40
  Wage 0.71 0.74 1.04 0.24 0.64 2.67
  Hours share 0.52 0.36 0.68 0.18 0.31 1.72
Female skilled 0.07 0.14  Wage component 2.61 0.79 0.30 0.90 0.68 0.76
  Wage 1.03 0.80 0.77 0.36 0.70 1.94
  Hours share 2.06 0.69 0.33 0.71 0.59 0.83
     Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984; HP-filtered, annual data.
          TABLE IV
  Evolution of Skill/Age Wage Components
         Average   Relative
       Wage Share      Standard Deviation    Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84
16-29 Unskilled 0.23 0.15
  Wage 0.96 0.99 1.03 0.33 0.86 2.59
  Hours share 1.67 0.90 0.54 0.58 0.78 1.35
16-29 Skilled 0.06 0.06
  Wage 0.73 1.33 1.81 0.25 1.15 4.55
  Hours share 2.75 1.25 0.46 0.95 1.09 1.15
30-59 Unskilled 0.46 0.44
  Wage 0.85 0.74 0.87 0.29 0.64 2.17
  Hours share 0.43 0.36 0.84 0.15 0.31 2.10
30-59 Skilled 0.19 0.31
  Wage 0.92 0.85 0.93 0.32 0.74 2.32
  Hours share 1.63 0.55 0.33 0.56 0.47 0.84
60-70 Unskilled 0.04 0.03
  Wage 1.33 1.07 0.80 0.46 0.92 2.02
  Hours share 3.17 1.41 0.45 1.10 1.23 1.12
60-70 Skilled 0.01 0.012
  Wage 2.76 1.38 0.50 0.95 1.19 1.25
  Hours share 7.05 3.03 0.43 2.43 2.63 1.08
      Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984; annual data, HP-filtered.
        TABLE V
                          Evolution of Education/Employment Status Wage Components
      Average                    Relative
   Wage Share           Standard Deviation           Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84
Hourly, unskilled 0.43 0.39
  Wage 1.01 1.22 1.21 0.35 1.06 3.03
  Hours share 1.45 0.45 0.31 0.50 0.39 0.78
Hourly, skilled 0.03 0.07
  Wage 1.71 1.86 1.09 0.59 1.61 2.73
  Hours share 3.79 2.03 0.53 1.31 1.764 1.34
Non-Hourly, unskilled 0.30 0.23
  Wage 1.08 0.83 0.77 0.37 0.72 1.93
  Hours share 1.52 0.84 0.55 0.53 0.73 1.38
Non-Hourly, skilled 0.24 0.31
  Wage 0.59 0.77 1.30 0.20 0.66 3.27
  Hours share 1.86 0.70 0.38 0.64 0.61 0.95
     Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984; annual data, HP-filtered.
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       TABLE VI
                                   Evolution of Skill/Sectors(11) Wage Components
         Average Relative
       Wage Share Standard Deviation Standard Deviation
Pre-84 Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84 Pre-84 Post-84 Pre/Post-84
MinOilGas unskilled 0.01 0.01
  Wage 2.48 1.70 0,69 0.86 1.52 1.77
  Hours share 8.86 4.18 0.47 3.06 3.74 1.22
Construct unskilled 0.06 0.054.05677362259242.543843107349890.6270606506567371.400653259457272.275403742001681.62453035870088
  Wage 1.45 0.97 0.67 0.50 0.87 1.74
  Hours share 3.84 1.90 0.50 1.33 1.70 1.28
Manuf-D unskilled 0.14 0.103.137542433136671.881646449205540.5997198410236061.083276870857311.683085469884511.5 369833434412
  Wage 0.84 1.01 1.20 0.29 0.90 3.11
  Hours share 3.47 1.19 0.34 1.20 1.07 0.89
Manuf-ND unskilled 0.08 0.06
  Wage 0.79 1.23 1.55 0.27 1.10 4.02
  Hours share 1.82 1.11 0.61 0.63 0.99 1.58
T&U unskilled 0.06 0.06
  Wage 1.414 0.91 0.65 0.49 0.82 1.68
  Hours share 2.65 1.27 0.48 0.92 1.14 1.24
Comm unskilled 0.02 0.01
  Wage 2.22 1.29 0.58 0.76 1.15 1.51
  Hours share 5.742 3.14 0.55 1.98 2.81 1.41
Whole T unskilled 0.04 0.03.810229503106972.045115168679030.5367433029982531.31 530731881621. 29304132079321.39054458230926
  Wage 1.26 0.91 0.72 0.44 0.81 1.86
  Hours share 3.11 2.00 0.64 1.07 1.79 1.67
Retail T unskilled 0.09 0.091.828155620889811.203286068427340.6581967392041140.63 942364578191.076309154006911.70519483835438
  Wage 1.15 1.00 0.87 0.40 0.90 2.26
  Hours share 1.36 0.72 0.53 0.47 0.64 1.36
FIRE unskilled 0.04 0.04
  Wage 1.19 0.99 0.84 0.41 0.89 2.16
  Hours share 3.16 1.66 0.52 1.09 1.48 1.36
Services unskilled 0.13 0.15
  Wage 0.46 0.69 1.50 0.16 0.62 3.88
  Hours share 1.41 0.73 0.52 0.49 0.65 1.34
Public unskilled 0.05 0.04
  Wage 1.13 0.61 0.54 0.39 0.55 1.41
  Hours share 4.34 2.04 0.47 1.50 1.82 1.22
MinOilGas skilled <0.01 <0.01
  Wage 6.21 3.87 0.62 2.14 3.46 1.62
  Hours share 11.05 8.26 0.75 3.81 7.39 1.94
Construct skilled 0.01 0.013.557989310988113.122547651191040.8776158043948311.228441561983192.79 040415727732.2 64532604926
  Wage 2.36 1.74 0.74 0.81 1.56 1.91
  Hours share 3.68 3.03 0.82 1.27 2.71 2.13
Manuf-D skilled 0.03 0.04
  Wage 1.50 1.25 0.83 0.52 1.12 2.16
  Hours share 2.99 2.25 0.75 1.03 2.02 1.95
Manuf-ND skilled 0.02 0.02
  Wage 1.56 1.18 0.76 0.54 1.07 1.98
  Hours share 5.66 2.43 0.43 1.95 2.17 1.11
T&U skilled 0.01 0.02
  Wage 2.10 2.12 1.01 0.73 1.90 2.61
  Hours share 5.94 2.24 0.378 2.05 2.01 0.98
Comm skilled <0.01 0.01
  Wage 4.54 2.15 0.47 1.57 1.93 1.23
  Hours share 9.27 3.32 0.36 3.20 2.97 0.93
Whole T skilled 0.01 0.01
  Wage 1.22 1.57 1.29 0.42 1.41 3.35
  Hours share 7.35 2.66 0.36 2.54 2.38 0.94
Retail T skilled 0.01 0.02
  Wage 2.99 1.93 0.64 1.03 1.72 1.67
  Hours share 3.93 1.75 0.45 1.36 1.57 1.16
FIRE skilled 0.02 0.04
  Wage 1.16 1.20 1.03 0.40 1.07 2.67
  Hours share 4.10 1.91 0.47 1.41 1.71 1.21
Services skilled 0.12 0.17
  Wage 1.09 1.01 0.92 0.38 0.90 2.40
  Hours share 2.22 0.54 0.24 0.77 0.48 0.63
Public skilled 0.02 0.03
  Wage 2.02 0.96 0.48 0.70 0.86 1.23
  Hours share 3.60 1.93 0.54 1.24 1.73 1.39
     Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2002 with split in 1984; annual, HP-filtered data. 10 industries and 1 public administration sector.
                 TABLE VII
                        Relative Volatility AccountingAcross Different Decompositions
Decomposition Gender/ Age/ Emp Status/ Industry(22)/
Skill Skill Skill Skill
CPS wage 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 %
 Changing s i 2.57 % 0.34% 11.98% 1.29 %
 Changing σ(hourly wages)² 96.51 % 84.22% 99.54% 76.97 %
 Changing σ(hours shares)² -3.97 % -5.18% 2.2% -1.35 %
 Changing correlations 4.89 % 20.62% -13.73% 23.09 %
  Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984 (Except for Industry(22)/Education, which stops in 2002).
HP-filtered data. Employment status stands for hourly paid or non-hourly (salaried) workers.
                 TABLE VIII
                      Volatility Accounting (absolute) Across Different Decompositions
Decomposition Gender/ Age/ Emp Status/ Industry(22)/
Skill Skill Skill Skill
CPS wage 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 %
 Changing s i 113.57% 117.78% 292.61% 114.13%
 Changing σ(hourly wages)² 132.72% -71.64% 254.93% -72.82%
 Changing σ(hours shares)² -176.24% -137.75% -129.75% -119.30%
 Changing correlations 29.95% 191.61% -317.80% 177.99%
     Notes : Total sample extends from 1973 to 2006 with split in 1984 (Except for Industry(22)/Education, which stops in 2002).
HP-filtered data. Employment status stands for hourly paid or non-hourly (salaried) workers.
           TABLE IX
  Model Simulations
US Data Simulation 1            Simulation 2                  Simulation 3                Simulation 4
g  = 0.85 and g  = 0.85 and g  = 0.15 and g  = 0.15 and
Pre-84 Post-84 Relative Pre-84 shock Post-84 shock Relative Pre-84 shock Relative Post-84 shock Relative
 s(y) 2.56 1.28 0.50 2.52 1.69 0.67 1.58 0.63 1.16 0.46
 s(n)/ s(y) 0.78 1.15 1.47 0.85 0.95 0.65 0.59 0.69 0.83 0.98
 s(w)/ s(y) 0.24 0.80 3.33 0.43 0.45 1.05 0.79 1.84 0.84 1.95
 s(y/n)/ s(y) 0.49 0.59 1.20 0.40 0.42 1.05 0.69 1.73 0.67 1.68
 r(y,w) 0.36 -0.14 -0.50 0.52 0.34 -0.18 0.73 0.21 0.45 -0.07
 r(y,y/n) 0.65 0.01 -0.64 0.54 0.32 -0.22 0.82 0.28 0.57 0.03
 r(n,y/n) 0.21 -0.50 -0.71 0.16 -0.10 -0.26 0.22 0.06 -0.12 -0.28
     Notes : All moments are H-P filtered. US data spans from 1953:2 to 2006:4. The 'Relative' column denotes the Post/Pre-84 ratios for standard deviations and
the Post-Pre-84 differences for correlations.
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